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A B S T R A C T
The article suggests an explanation for seemingly diverse
patterns of change in domestic economic institutions follow-
ing the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). It argues that EMU participants redesigned ill-fitting
domestic fiscal and wage-setting institutions in order to
counter the anticipated destabilizing effects of the ‘one size
fits all’ monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB).
After outlining the argument, the article identifies general
economic and institutional conditions that are required for
the use of fiscal and wage-setting institutions as effective
stabilizers in a monetary union. It then undertakes a
comparative assessment to detect country-specific
mismatches between anticipated needs and the available
domestic economic institutions. Finally, the article surveys
institutional changes in 10 member states between the mid
1990s and 2002 and shows that the observed institutional
adjustments largely correspond to the expected correction
of initial mismatches.
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Introduction
The question of how Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) affects policy-
making institutions in member states is certainly not new in the literature.
Especially during the early years of EMU, a number of analyses sought to use
the implications of the comparative assessment of the interplay between
different policy orientations of central banks and different organizational
structures of wage-setting to draw relevant conclusions for EMU (mainly Hall
and Franzese, 1998; Iversen, 1998; Iversen, 1999b; Soskice and Iversen, 1998).
Although this literature made significant achievements in the understanding
of the interplay between the single monetary policy and domestic economic
policy-making within a framework of long-term factors, it put little emphasis
on cyclical phenomena. This paper takes a different approach. Since the
European Central Bank (ECB) does not take into account economic develop-
ments in single member states but rather targets the euro area as a whole, its
monetary policy is likely to result in significant short-term deviations around
the long-term trend generated by suboptimal real interest rates. As soon as
the two main factors underlying the appropriate conduct of monetary policy
– the inflation rate and the output gap (see Taylor, 1993) – significantly deviate
from the euro area average, monetary policy has adverse and, in the medium
term, even self-enforcing pro-cyclical effects. When European Union (EU)
member states decided to join EMU, they had to anticipate this risk.
The main mechanism driving such self-enforcing cycles in a monetary
union is the country-specific real interest rate. Member states with inflation
rates higher than the union average will face low real interest rates, trigger-
ing higher rates of investment and consumption. These effects will drive up
the domestic growth rate beyond its long-term potential, leading to even
higher inflation rates, further reducing real interest rates and ultimately
resulting in cyclical overshooting and price bubbles. Similarly, in a context of
low inflation and high real interest rates, growth rates are likely to fall below
potential growth, thus triggering even higher real interest rates and poten-
tially generating a textbook bust cycle.
The only mechanical way (i.e. not policy induced) to stop such self-
enforcing real interest cycles is the real exchange rate effect: high-inflation
countries will ultimately face reduced external demand, whereas low-
inflation countries will improve their competitiveness. As a consequence, self-
enforcing cyclical phenomena will be stopped by a decline (or boom) in
exports caused by the real appreciation (depreciation) of the exchange rate.
Prior to the start of EMU, most theoretical analyses of monetary unions
assumed that the real exchange rate effect would have primacy over the real
interest effect and that domestic stabilization would therefore be generated
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automatically (see mainly Frankel and Rose, 1998). This approach was built
on the assumption that domestic prices (and thus also real interest rates) in
a monetary union are bound to converge, given the mobility of goods and
services in the internal market. In EMU, however, a significant share of
domestic output derives from so-called ‘spatially fixed factors’, such as real
estate and heavy machinery, which are not affected by direct price competi-
tion (Maclennan et al., 1998). Moreover, as analyses of the much more inte-
grated US states indicate, regional economic adjustments based on real
exchange differentials take a significant amount of time (around four years;
see Arnold and Kool, 2002), indicating that adjustment within the EU might
take even longer (see IMF, 2004, for first evidence in that respect).
The article suggests that, depending on the expected output gap and
inflation deviations from the euro area average, member countries designed
institutions that would allow the correction of a domestic boom or recession.
This argument obviously raises the question of domestic policy-makers’ moti-
vations to design appropriate institutions. Scholars convinced by the patterns
of the political business cycle might readily agree that correction of domestic
bust cycles ranks high on the political agenda, yet they would probably cast
doubt on the assumed policy goal of correcting an inflationary high-growth
bubble. Although such doubts are certainly valid, they do not bring into
question the overall argument of this paper. Putting appropriate institutions
at the disposal of policy-making is the necessary condition for their appli-
cation, but it leaves policy-makers the choice of whether or not to use them.
The article thus expects to detect institutional adjustments in those areas in
which the properties of the relevant institutions in the status quo ante (i.e.
before joining EMU) could not be considered instrumental in delivering
appropriate policy responses to the anticipated destabilizing economic effects
of EMU. Although this argument is used to explain institutional change as a
reaction to EMU, it could in principle also be applied more widely to any
fully credible fixed exchange rate regime. What is so specific about EMU,
however, is the degree of credibility. It is possible to correct a fixed exchange
rate and even to drop out of a currency board, as Argentina did in 2002, but
not to alter the conversion rates in a monetary union. Moreover, even in a
fully functional fixed exchange rate regime, there can (and, from an economic
perspective, mostly should) be different nominal interest rates.
The full need for appropriate domestic institutions to cope with the
absence of monetary policy thus only arises if a currency peg is fully credible
– institutional reforms in the Netherlands in 1982 fit the framework suggested
in this paper, see below – or in a monetary union (the adoption of a foreign
currency as legal tender in a domestic economy, often quite wrongly labelled
‘dollarization’, no matter which currency is chosen, would have similar
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effects). The formal transition from the European Monetary System to EMU
thus represents a clear regime shift. Yet the timing of that shift is of a subtle
nature: what matters most is the point at which the credible decision to adopt
a hard peg (and to stick to it for good) was taken. The penultimate section of
the article reports individual starting dates of de facto accession to EMU for
each member state.
The article is organized as follows. We outline the main arguments, and
review the institutional status quo ante in 10 EMU member states. The nature
of the cyclical imbalances that EMU member states had to anticipate before
joining EMU are then studied. Institutional adjustments between the mid
1990s and 2000 in 10 EMU member countries are reviewed, showing that the
expected patterns of adjustment can actually be observed, before the article’s
conclusion.
Institutions and cyclical stabilization
In the absence of domestic monetary policy, fiscal policy and wage-setting
can stabilize economic cycles under certain institutional conditions.
In a boom, wage-setting and fiscal policy need to act jointly if they wish
to cool down the economy. Wage-setters have to accept wage increases below
the often claimed rule of a productivity increase plus expected inflation in
order to discount the inflationary effect of economic growth rates above
potential. A contractionary fiscal policy needs to accompany real-wage
restraint in order to prevent firms from exploiting lower wage costs to boost
production even further. Naturally, such a mix between countercyclical wage-
setting and contractionary fiscal policy can succeed only if governments do
not redirect the additional resources to the production cycle but rather keep
them as a surplus or as a significantly reduced deficit (in a system of fiscal
redistribution, a surplus from high-growth regions would go to regions with
lower growth). It should be added that fiscal policy alone is likely to fail in
an attempt to cool down the economy. A contractionary fiscal stance is likely
to be followed by higher wage claims, thus triggering a pro-cyclical wage
policy. In short, the correction of a boom cycle requires fairly close cooper-
ation between fiscal policy and wage negotiators.
In a bust cycle, wage-setting is of little use as a short-term stabilizing
instrument. Wage-setting cannot provide an effective response either.
Although wage restraint can ultimately restore growth through gains in
competitiveness, in the short run it depresses domestic demand (mainly
consumption) even further. Real-wage increases are not a good response
either: they would even further reduce firms’ profits and depress domestic
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investment. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, can have a stabilizing effect.
Though economists are generally sceptical about fiscal stimuli, they do not
dispute their economic effectiveness; rather they are worried about political
implementation. They argue that deficit spending fails if consumers take into
account later tax increases (e.g. Lucas, 1996), that wages and prices in EMU
member states are too rigid to allow for balancing adjustments (e.g. Layard
et al., 1991), and that political implementation is difficult owing to time-lags
at both the domestic (e.g. Krugman, 2000) and the EMU levels (e.g. Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs, 1992; Artis and Winkler, 1998). Effective fiscal stabilization
in a downturn is thus mainly hampered by institutional parameters (wage
rigidity and fiscal institutions) that can – at least theoretically – be resolved
through institutional change.
Table 1 summarizes how domestic economic policies can stabilize the
domestic business cycle in a monetary union.
With regard to the implementation of the appropriate stabilization
policies, however, certain institutional features are required.
Fiscal policy
As discussed above, fiscal policy can theoretically intervene as a cyclical
stabilizer in both a boom and a downturn if the fiscal authorities can react in
a timely and decisive enough manner to yield the desired effect. Such a
reaction is possible only if the budgetary authority can adjust swiftly to
unforeseen circumstances and can push through a policy stance that is econ-
omically required as a stabilizing measure. However, not all types of fiscal
institutions are similarly capable of producing desired policy outcomes (von
Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1995; von Hagen and Hallerberg, 1997;
Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999, see also de Haan et al., 1999). The central
arguments of this literature relate to the risk of an ineffective fiscal policy
outcome if the budgetary process is not dominated by one key actor defend-
ing the overarching objective of fiscal policy (‘logic of delegation’), or if such
an overarching objective is not fixed ex ante in a contract binding for all
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Table 1 Possible adjustment policies in EMU
Fiscal policy Wage-setting
Boom cycle Can stabilize but needs to Can stabilize but needs to 
act jointly with wage-setting act jointly with fiscal policy
Bust cycle Can stabilize Cannot stabilize
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participants in the budgetary process (‘logic of commitment’). Originally, this
body of literature focused on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing
public debt and budgetary deficits. However, it can also be applied to the
context of this paper, given that the logic of delegation (henceforth referred
to with the more general term of ‘government effectiveness’) nicely captures
a key requirement for fiscal stabilization in EMU, which is that stabilizing
measures need to be implemented in a rapid and decisive manner.
That said, even if stabilizing measures can be implemented, they are not
necessarily effective in economic terms. Countries with a very large share of
public expenditure can more easily use fiscal policy to influence the economic
cycle. Subnational authorities might have a large share in total public expen-
ditures but are generally not willing to contribute to nation-wide goals of
economic policies (Scharpf, 1991; Hughes and Smith, 1991). The probability
of effective stabilization thus tends to increase with the share of the central
governments’ expenditures in total public expenditures, i.e. with fiscal
centralization.
Both variables described in this section (the effectiveness of the budgetary
process and fiscal centralization) can be easily operationalized. The effective-
ness of the budgetary procedure is mapped using data by von Hagen for the
year 1992 on the logic of delegation in the budgetary process.1 Von Hagen
looks at four components of the effectiveness of the budgetary procedure: the
structure of negotiations within government; the involvement of parliament;
the transparency of the budget draft; and the flexibility of budget execution
(see Table 2). Following Scharpf (1991), fiscal centralization is measured as
the centralization of fiscal spending (the share of the central government in
total public spending) and the government spending ratio (total government
spending as a share of GDP).
Putting together the results of these two types of country classification,
Table 3 gives an overview of fiscal institutions in EMU in the status quo ante
(i.e. in 1990). Only countries in the north-west cell could rely on fiscal insti-
tutions capable of successfully correcting cyclical imbalances before joining
EMU. However, as pointed out above, in the special circumstances of cyclical
overheating, fiscal institutions cannot act alone, but require support by wage-
setting.
Wage-setting
For the purpose of this article, it is important to identify the institutional
conditions under which wage-setters are capable of taking the requirements
of cyclical stabilization (i.e. real-wage restraint) into account. As the ‘corporat-
ist’ literature has argued, only coordinated and centralized wage-setting
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systems are capable of influencing concretely defined target rates of wage
variation at the aggregate level (e.g. Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Streeck
and Schmitter, 1985).2 Indeed, in a fully decentralized system, a cyclical boom
would trigger no incentive for the individual wage-setter to accept real-wage
restraints, because there is no guarantee that other wage-setters would adopt
the same behaviour.3 To overcome this collective action problem, concretely
defined target rates need to be set and adhered to. It follows that real-wage
restraint can succeed only in a system with a wage-setting authority capable
of detecting ex ante and enforcing ex post the rate of wage variation required
for cyclical stabilization. Moreover, there has to be some dialogue between
wage-setters and government to allow coordinated stabilization.
The presence of an instance of internal leadership is well captured in an
indicator of the Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (GWL) index on the role of
union federations in wage negotiations (labelled CONIN in the GWL data
set) (Golden et al., 2002). What this indicator does not capture, however, is
the special role of ‘pattern-bargaining systems’. Such systems are character-
ized by semi-centralization, with a significant amount of horizontal coordi-
nation across unions (Traxler and Kittel, 2000). One union plays the role of a
leading wage-setter, whose agreements are generally followed by the other
unions – Germany and Austria fall into this category (Traxler et al., 2001).
Pattern-bargaining systems were thus added to the GWL indicator as scoring
‘high’ with regard to internal leadership. Table 4 provides an overview of the
resulting wage-setting systems prior to EMU.4 The second institutional
characteristic relates to the link between wage-setters and the government.
The GWL data set contains a variable that precisely indicates governments’
involvement (GOVIN).5 On the basis of Table 4, the status quo ante in wage-
setting can be established (Table 5).
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Table 3 The status quo ante in fiscal institutions, 1990
Centralization
High Low
France Denmark
High UK Germany
Netherlands Finland
Government
Austria
effectiveness
Belgium Sweden
Low
Portugal Spain
Italy
Ireland
Sources: Table 2.
Putting together the information on fiscal institutions and wage-setting
institutions, it becomes clear that only one EMU member state completely
fulfilled the institutional prerequisites of domestic stabilization before joining
EMU: the Netherlands. The special status of the Netherlands is not really
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Table 4 Wage-setting institutions, 1990
Internal leadership Government involvement
CONIN GOVIN
Austria 3 (pattern) High 6 High
Belgium 4 Low 4 Low
Denmark 1 Low 5 High
Finland 9 High 9 High
France 4 Low 3 Low
Germany 1 (pattern) High 3 Low
Ireland 3a Low – High
Italy 1 Low 8 Lowb
Netherlands 9 High 6 High
Portugal 1a Low – Low
Spain 3 Low 3 Low
Sweden 9 High 5 High
UK 1 Low 2 Low
Sources: Golden et al. (2002: variables CONIN and GOVIN). Ireland, Portugal and Spain are
classified on the basis of Traxler et al. (2001: 114).
a Own classification based on the approach in Golden et al. (2002).
b The classification for Italy was modified from high to low (for reasons see main text).
Table 5 The status quo ante in wage-setting institutions, 1990
Government involvement
High Low
Finland Germany
High
Netherlands
Austria
Internal
Sweden
leadership
Denmark Belgium
Ireland France
UK
Low Italy
Portugal
Spain
Source: Table 4.
surprising – and to a certain extent even confirms the approach chosen in this
paper – since the Netherlands had been a member of a de facto currency union
with Germany since 1979. Without going into too much detail, it is interest-
ing to note that, right after the Dutch decision to reproduce German monetary
policy almost fully in the Netherlands (there was only one devaluation of 2%
in 1983), the wage-setting system completely changed (the Wassenaar agree-
ment in 1982). For all other countries, the status quo ante indicates that reforms
were necessary to prepare for joining EMU. Table 6 lists the missing features.
Before considering the actual reforms implemented in EMU member
states since the early 1990s, it is necessary to look at the expected adjustment
pressures. This is because of the differing institutional requirements, depend-
ing on the type of adjustment pressure (boom or bust).
Assessing the expected economic pressures from EMU
Two factors need to be taken into account when assessing the anticipated
economic pressure on EMU members: (i) their output gap in relation to the
euro area output gap; (ii) their inflation rate in relation to the euro area infla-
tion rate (Taylor, 1993). I assume that no EMU member state – not even
Germany – could anticipate that the monetary policy of the ECB would
actually fit its domestic economic requirements. None of the present 12 euro
area member states represents more than one-third of euro area GDP, and
current analyses of the ECB’s policy confirm that decisions are based on
developments in the euro area as a whole (IMF, 2004; Surico, 2003a,b).
European Union Politics 7(1)1 2 2
Table 6 Institutional preparedness for joining EMU (status quo ante in 1990)
Fiscal policy Wage-setting
Austria – Centralization missing ++ Both features available
Belgium – Political strength missing –  – Both features missing
Denmark – Centralization missing – Internal leadership missing
Germany – Centralization missing – Government involvement missing
Finland – Centralization missing ++ Both features available
France ++ Both features available –  – Both features missing
Ireland – Political strength missing – Internal leadership missing
Italy – Political strength missing –  – Both features missing
Netherlands ++ Both features available ++ Both features available
Portugal – Political strength missing –  – Both features missing
Spain –  – Both features missing –  –  Both features missing
Sweden –  – Both features missing – Internal leadership missing
UK ++ Both features available –  – Both features missing
Figure 1 maps the correlation and average deviation of business cycles
(i.e. the output gap) for the period 1982–95. Greater distances from 0 on both
axes indicate an overall stronger tendency to deviate from euro area output
gap data. The more important indicator is on the area axis: countries with
positive values on this axis are likely to expect higher growth momentum
(mainly Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands). Finland’s data are somewhat
distorted by the exceptionally pronounced recession of early 1990.
For the relation of the domestic inflation rate to the euro area inflation
rate, a different time-period was chosen (1989–99). The reason relates to the
anti-inflationary policies that European central banks started to adopt at
different points during the 1980s. The period 1982–8 would distort the data
unnecessarily and would yield largely irrelevant results for this study. The
period 1989–99 offers a compromise between a reasonable starting point and
an acceptable number of years.
Figure 2 shows that deviations generally remain within a 1% margin.
Although this can certainly be considered a rather satisfactory result, one
should take into account that 1 percentage point is the equivalent of 100 basis
points in terms of the real interest rate. What is of considerable importance,
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Figure 1 Domestic output gap and euro area output gap, 1982–1995.
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook. 
Note: Deviations from the output gap have been inverted: a higher numerical value implies
average deviations above potential (i.e. inflationary pressure).
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however, is the fact that a few countries stand out as clearly ‘high inflation-
ary’, namely Portugal, Spain and Italy. With regard to the correlation values,
it is remarkable how little synchronization can be detected.
The economic pressures to adjust to EMU can now be put together in a
way that allows us to assess how member states were likely to perceive their
own position, i.e. which kind of economic pressure they had to anticipate
under a ceteris paribus assumption (Table 7). There are three groups of
countries:
• Countries in the first group (Austria, Belgium, France and Germany) were
likely to face high real rates and thus a cyclical downturn. These countries
could be expected to adjust fiscal institutions only.
• Countries in the second group (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) had to expect
very low real rates and thus a cyclical boom. These countries could be
expected to adjust both fiscal and wage-setting institutions and see the
emergence of close links between wage-setters and government.
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Figure 2 Domestic inflation and euro area inflation, 1989–99.
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook.
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Portugal (0.19 / 3.64)
1.21.0
• A third group comprises countries that do not easily fit into one of the
two groups. The data for Italy, Finland and the Netherlands do not give
sufficiently clear indications of the expected adjustment pressures.
The actual reforms: An overview
This section summarizes the actual reforms of fiscal policy institutions and
wage-setting institutions between the mid 1990s and 2001. It describes insti-
tutional changes (or lack thereof) in those areas that were identified as repre-
senting a misfit with regard to the specific policy challenge. It would have
been beyond the scope of this article to test systematically for alternative
explanations. This section uses short descriptions of how reforms were
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Table 7 Anticipated economic pressures in EMU
Average 
inflation 
deviation 
Anticipated from EMU 
Output gap effect of ECB aggregate 
Inflation deviation deviation monetary policy inflation 
prior to EMU prior to EMU (ceteris paribus) (1999–2003)
France Lower than EMU Lower than EMU High real –0.5
interest rates
Germany Lower than EMU Average High real –0.6
interest rates
Austria Lower than EMU Higher than EMU High real –0.4
interest rates
Belgium Lower than EMU Lower than EMU High real –0.1
interest rates
Spain Higher than EMU Higher than EMU Low real +1.2
interest rates
Portugal Higher than EMU Higher than EMU Low real +1.2
interest rates
Ireland Average Higher than EMU Low real +2.1
interest rates
Italy Higher than EMU Lower than EMU ? +0.3
Finland Lower than EMU Lower than EMU ? +0.2
Netherlands Lower than EMU Higher than EMU ? +1.3
Sources: Own indicators; inflation data from Eurostat.
implemented to underscore the link to EMU. A more encompassing assess-
ment of the reforms and their underlying explanations can be found in Ender-
lein (2004a).
It is quite striking that most EMU members actually aimed at creating
the necessary institutions for domestic stabilization. As the overview indi-
cates, they sometimes chose intermediate or innovative ways to overcome
actual institutional constraints. In fiscal policy, there was a general trend
towards more political strength in the budgetary process (Hallerberg et al.,
2001; see also Hallerberg 2004). Fiscal policies also became more centralized
– mainly within the framework of ‘domestic stability pacts’ that gave central
governments more influence over subnational spending. In wage-setting,
there was a pattern of more coordinated approaches combined with stronger
government influence, often taking place within the framework of social pacts
(Hancké and Rhodes, 2005; Hancké and Soskice, 2003; and Hassel, 2003). Such
pacts usually require, and sometimes even create, some internal leadership
within the wage-setting system, while also establishing a direct link with
government.
Table 8 summarizes the results and indicates that the actual reforms
largely confirm the expectations of the approach.
Institutional adjustment in countries facing high real
interest rates
For Austria, Belgium, France and Germany, high real interest rates and low
growth rates could be predicted as potential economic effects of EMU. These
countries therefore had to rely on fiscal policy as a stabilizing instrument.
Before joining EMU, three out of the four countries did not have appropriate
fiscal institutions. Only France’s institutions fulfilled the two required criteria
(centralization and budgetary effectiveness). Austria and Belgium imple-
mented the predicted reforms, whereas Germany did not.
Austria joined a de facto monetary union with Germany in the early 1980s
but, given the high structural similarities between both economies, Austria
did not experience any destabilizing effect from that union – unlike Belgium
and the Netherlands (see below) (OECD, 1998a: 3). Taking into account that
in EMU the ECB would target not Germany but the euro area average as a
whole, Austria had to anticipate domestic destabilization from 1999 onwards.
Austria was expected to centralize fiscal spending or at least to enhance
control over subnational spending. The latter was implemented. In 2000, the
central government imposed a ‘Pact for reaching a deficit of 0 percent’ upon
regional governments and local governments. Although the title alludes to
the Stability and Growth Pact in Europe, its contents clearly increase the
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authority of the central government over subnational spending: subnational
governments and local governments have to achieve budgetary balances of
0.75% and 0%, respectively, and, in exchange, are given a guarantee of fiscal
support from central government in periods of cyclical downturns (Haller-
berg et al., 2001: 18). The underlying logic and implementation of this measure
fully correspond to the hypothesis of this article (see also Enderlein, 2001).
Belgium joined a de facto monetary union with Germany in March 1992,
when the Belgian National Bank (BNB) announced that it would not accept
further devaluations vis-à-vis the D-Mark and closely follow the monetary
policy of the Bundesbank without taking into account any potential destabil-
izing effects.6 Belgium was expected to increase the effectiveness of the
budgetary procedure and did so from 1994 onwards. The Belgian government
authorized the Conseil supérieur des finances (CSF), which had been a simple
advisory body to the ministry of finance, to set a binding budgetary balance
before the negotiations on the budget among ministers actually started. The
CSF has thus become the main player in Belgian macroeconomic policy-
making, largely controlling the impact of the Belgian budget on the economic
cycle. What is remarkable in this respect is the involvement of the BNB in the
CSF. As Hallerberg (2000) argues, the three representatives of the BNB play
a key role in the CSF and de facto set the net balance of the Belgian budget.
Germany clearly set the monetary policy stance for the European
monetary system (EMS) until 1999, but had to expect a destabilizing policy
by the ECB thereafter (this expectation is now widely confirmed; see IMF,
2004, for evidence). Germany was expected to centralize fiscal spending or at
least to enhance control of subnational spending. In accordance with the
framework of this paper, an attempt to implement a domestic stability pact
was made in 2003. Yet this attempt largely failed (see Bundesbank, 2005, for
a detailed discussion of the matter). Although this conclusion formally contra-
dicts the approach of this paper, a few additional remarks may indicate why
the failure of that reform does not necessarily stand in contrast to its sugges-
tions. First, there was less awareness of the potential destabilizing effects
resulting from EMU in the German government. Indeed, before the start of
stage three of EMU, most German officials assumed that the ECB would take
German economic conditions very strongly into account – or even fully target
the German economy. This, however, did not happen, and Germany has had
to struggle with real interest rates at a much higher level than has been appro-
priate for the German economy. In September 2001, officials in the German
ministry of finance confirmed in interviews for this study that they had under-
estimated the destabilizing impact on Germany of the ECB’s monetary policy.
Indicating that they had hoped the ECB would adopt a much stronger focus
on the largest economy of the euro area, they clearly pointed out that the main
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Table 8 Predicted and actual reforms
Fiscal institutions Wage-setting institutions
————————————————————————— ———————————————————————————
Predicted reforms Actual reforms Predicted reforms Actual reforms
France None None None None
Germany Centralization of fiscal None None None
spending or enhanced 
control of subnational (largely failed attempt to 
spending establish a national stability 
pact in 2003)
Austria Centralization of fiscal Domestic stability pacts None None
spending or enhanced (2000, 2003)
control of subnational 
spending
Belgium Increased effectiveness of Delegation of decisions on None None
the budgetary procedure budgetary balance to the 
CSF (from 1994)
Spain Centralization of fiscal Enhanced control of Increased government Direct negotiations between 
spending or enhanced subnational spending, involvement in government and 
control of subnational domestic stability pact wage-setting wage-setters from 1996 
spending (2002) onwards
Stronger hierarchical 
Increased effectiveness of Several reforms of the organization (internal Social Pact 1996
the budgetary procedure budgetary procedure leadership) within 
(1994–2000) wage-setting institutions
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Table 8 Continued
Fiscal institutions Wage-setting institutions
————————————————————————— ———————————————————————————
Predicted reforms Actual reforms Predicted reforms Actual reforms
Portugal Increased effectiveness of Reform of the budgetary Increased government Direct negotiations 
the budgetary procedure procedure (2000–2001) involvement in between government and 
wage-setting wage-setters from 1996 
onwards
Stronger hierarchical 
organization (internal Social Pact 1996
leadership) within 
wage-setting institutions
Ireland Increased effectiveness of Reform of the budgetary Stronger hierarchical Various Social Pacts and 
the budgetary procedure procedure (1997) organization (internal creation of appropriate 
leadership) within incentives through 
wage-setting institutions ‘political exchange’
Italy Increased effectiveness of Reform of the budgetary Increased government Direct negotiations 
the budgetary procedure procedure (1997) involvement in between government and 
wage-setting wage-setters from 1993 
Enhanced control of onwards
subnational spending, Stronger hierarchical 
domestic stability pact organization (internal Various social pacts from 
(1999) leadership) within 1993 onwards
wage-setting institutions
Finland Centralization of fiscal None None None
spending or enhanced 
control of subnational (But successful creation 
spending of ‘EMU buffers’)
Netherlands None None None None
obstacle to fiscal stabilization was the deeply rooted tradition of fiscal decen-
tralization in Germany. The role of the German Länder as a co-legislator on
matters concerning their own spending authority makes a step towards
greater fiscal centralization almost impossible to implement.
France joined a de facto monetary union with Germany in the late 1980s
(the last devaluation of 6% vis-à-vis Germany took place in 1986). In France,
no reforms were expected since the highly centralized and effective budgetary
system was already well in place before the start of stage three of EMU.
In short, the patterns and motivations of institutional adjustment in three
of the four country cases are broadly in line with the expectations of the
approach. What should be highlighted at this stage is the fact that none of
the three countries made any serious attempt to build so-called ‘social pacts’
between government and wage-setters. Although this is sharply in contrast
with the experiences of countries in the second group, this lack of consulta-
tion with wage-setters comes as no surprise for the approach chosen in this
paper, since the specific economic situation faced by these countries simply
did not call for such ‘social pacts’.
Institutional adjustment in countries facing low real
interest rates
Ireland, Portugal and Spain had to expect a context of cyclical overheating
from joining EMU. They thus needed close cooperation between fiscal policy-
making and wage-setting. The approach of this paper is confirmed by the
patterns of institutional adjustment in all three countries.
Ireland’s de facto accession to EMU took place in late 1998, when Irish
interest rates sharply decreased to come close to the nominal level expected
by the ECB from 1999 onwards. Ireland was expected (i) to increase the effec-
tiveness of its budgetary procedure, (ii) to generate internal leadership in the
wage-setting system. Both reforms were implemented.
Ireland’s budgetary procedure was significantly altered in 1997 when the
Irish finance minister was given the right to veto spending positions agreed
by parliament if these positions were considered to go against the macro-
economic stance chosen by the government (de Haan et al., 1999, note a
significant increase in comparison with the von Hagen indicator). Reform of
the Irish wage-setting structure was a more difficult task.7 Because the Irish
government could not impose internal leadership on unions, it tried to
develop incentives that would convince the group of unions to ensure imple-
mentation of wage agreements struck at the central level. It offered to cut
taxes in exchange for actually implemented real-wage restraint (‘political
exchange’; see Pizzorno, 1978; Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). There are now
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several indications that this attempt actually resulted in much stronger
internal cohesion of the wage-setting process, thus producing to a certain
extent the desired institutional reform (Hancké, 2002).
Spain’s de facto accession to EMU dates back to the mid 1990s. The last
realignment in the EMS took place in 1995 (+7%) and one year later the Aznar
government was largely elected upon the commitment to move from a soft
to a hard peg. Spain’s system of economic policy institutions had to be
completely overhauled in the context of joining EMU. None of the four insti-
tutional criteria in fiscal policy-making and wage-setting was met by Spain
in the early 1990s.
The reform of the budgetary procedure took place in several steps
between 1994 and 1999 (OECD, 2000b), before a far-reaching reform was
finally implemented in 2000. In that reform, a clear administrative distinction
was introduced between the economic ministry, in charge of defining the
macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy, and the finance ministry, in charge of
allocating the overall amount decided upon by the economic ministry to the
other ministries. Starting in 1995, Spain also made several attempts incremen-
tally to change the clearly decentralized system of public spending. Although
the complex interplay between the regions and the central government has
not been fundamentally altered (Gordo and Hernández de Cos, 2000), since
1997 the central government has the right to veto regional budgets based on
increasing debt and deficits (Hallerberg et al., 2001). This last measure clearly
fits the framework of this paper because it makes it possible for the central
government to prevent regions from running pro-cyclical deficits in the
context of cyclical overheating.
In wage-setting, reforms started after the election in 1996 when the Aznar
government succeeded in building an unprecedented dialogue with the
unions by threatening to privatize the public pension system and withdrew
this plan only when the unions agreed to enter into direct negotiations with
the government (Pérez and Pochet, 1999). In an approach that is very similar
to that of the Irish government, the Spanish government then tried to end
conflicts between the two main unions (UGT and CC.OO) by suggesting a
‘social pact’ based on an exchange of real-wage restraint for tax cuts. This
measure was largely successful and established clear leadership in the
Spanish wage-setting system, while also increasing governmental influence
over collective bargaining (see mainly the two country reports on Spain for
2001 and 2002 of the European Industrial Relations Observatory).
Portugal’s de facto accession to EMU also took place in the mid 1990s. In
1994, almost the complete executive of the Banco de Portugal was changed,
with the aim of finally obtaining a firm commitment from the central bank to
the EMS (Torres, 1998: 193–4). The last realignment took place (+3.5%) in 1995,
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and the new Guterres government was elected largely on the basis of prepar-
ing Portugal for EMU accession. Portugal was expected to adjust its insti-
tutions in three areas: to increase the effectiveness of the budgetary procedure;
to increase government involvement in wage-setting; and to generate stronger
internal leadership in collective bargaining.
The budgetary procedure was completely overhauled with the ‘Frame-
work Law for the State Budget’ (2001) and the ‘Budgetary Stability Law’
(2002). Both reforms considerably strengthened the ministry of finance by
providing it with the opportunity to establish an overall fiscal stance before
entering into negotiations with ministries; it also obtained the right to reject
claims by other ministries to increase spending beyond a predetermined level
(see Bronchi, 2003, for a detailed discussion).
In wage-setting, reforms were implemented in two steps. First, in 1996,
there was a clear and explicit attempt by the government to end the relation-
ship of ‘no trust’ between government and unions (da Paz Campos Lima and
Naumann, 2000). In December 1996, the ‘Strategic Concertation to Modern-
ize Portugal’ social pact was signed. It contained far-reaching measures on
joint economic policy management by government and unions and largely
contributed to ending the often conflictual competition between the CGTP
and UGT unions (da Paz Campos Lima and Naumann, 2000).
The similarities between the three EMU member states facing low real
interest rates and high growth are striking. All of them had to make consider-
able adjustments to their institutions. All of them used the approach of estab-
lishing a social pact to seek to convince wage-setters to contribute to cyclical
stabilization, thus generating stronger internal leadership in collective
bargaining while enhancing governmental influence over wage-setting.
Institutional adjustments in countries with
indeterminate real interest effects
Italy, Finland and the Netherlands do not really fall into either of the patterns
of the previous groups. No clear economic prediction could be made about
the effect that these countries had to anticipate in the run-up to EMU.
Finland’s de facto accession to EMU took place between 1996 and 1998,
when the Bank of Finland succeeded in defending the hard peg while continu-
ing to bring nominal interest rates closer to the joint EMU level at the end of
1998. Finland’s business cycle is structurally very different from that in the
rest of the euro area (see OECD, 1998b) and thus Finland had to prepare for
cyclical corrections as a reaction to asymmetric shocks and/or a destabiliz-
ing monetary policy by the ECB. Finland therefore very explicitly entered a
discussion on how to use wage-setting and fiscal policy-making as cyclical
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stabilizers. Finland was expected to centralize its fiscal spending or at least
to enhance control over subnational spending. Although neither of these
reforms was implemented as such, Finland found a rather creative different
solution that fully confirms the expectations of this paper: the so-called ‘EMU
buffers’.8
Starting in 1998, employers, employees and the government began to put
money into a fund that would be large enough to finance aggregate wage
adjustments of 3% for all wage earners in Finland by keeping the social
security contributions of employers constant during a downturn. This wage
adjustment is the equivalent of a nominal exchange rate adjustment of 10%.
The EMU buffers are thus an interesting middle way between fiscal stabiliza-
tion and wage-setting adjustments: functioning to a certain extent like insur-
ance (in this case financed by the government and wage-setters), the system
allows adjustments to be made to the pressures arising from EMU indepen-
dently from year-to-year fiscal policy-making or wage-setting. In short,
although Finland was identified as a special case in this paper, the establish-
ment of the ‘EMU buffers’ is further confirmation of the direct link between
joining EMU and the design of appropriate institutions to counter the
destabilizing effects of EMU.
The Netherlands constitutes a special case from various perspectives.
First, it had already joined a de facto monetary union with Germany in 1979.
Second, no clear type of economic pressure could be identified. Third, it was
identified as the only country not expected to undertake any reforms since
the appropriate institutions were already in place. In fact, after deciding in
the early 1980s to follow German monetary policy very closely, the Wasse-
naar agreement (1982) implemented the changes that the approach of this
article expected from some EMU members after their de facto accession.
However, even in the Dutch case there are clear signs of preparatory
measures in anticipation of cyclical destabilization under EMU. Most impor-
tantly, the second Kok government established an ‘automatic’ system
allowing the use of fiscal policy in the context of cyclical destabilization
(especially a downturn). The system establishes a procedure for adjusting the
budget to unforeseen cyclical circumstances. Missing budgetary income is
compensated 75% by new debt and 25% by tax increases if the budgetary
deficit is lower than 1.75% of GDP before the adjustment procedure. If it is
higher than 1.75% of GDP, the share of tax increases rises to 50% (Hallerberg
et al., 2001; Ewijck and Reininga, 1999). The main objective of this procedure
was clearly to avoid lengthy political discussions about tax increases at a time
of cyclical pressure and thus a need for rapid stabilization. Although the
Netherlands had already fulfilled the institutional prerequisites for an effec-
tive stabilization policy before joining EMU, additional adjustments were
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nonetheless implemented so as to make the Dutch system able to react swiftly
to cyclical imbalances.
Italy’s de facto accession to EMU can be situated somewhere between
1995 and 1998. During that three-year period, Italian economic policy basi-
cally did everything to get into the EMU club. In 1996, real interest rates
reached a record 6%, accompanied by a strongly contractionary fiscal policy
stance – a more restrictive economic policy is hard to imagine (see OECD,
1997: 46–68). However, even before that period, the pressure in Italy to
prepare for EMU was high, especially considering the challenge of meeting
the Maastricht criteria, which were quite bluntly targeting the Italian case
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 532–3). Italy was expected (i) to increase the
effectiveness of its budgetary procedure, (ii) to increase government involve-
ment in wage-setting, and (iii) to generate internal leadership in collective
bargaining.
In the area of fiscal policy, the reform of the budgetary procedure was
implemented in 1997. The reform, which considerably strengthened the
government vis-à-vis the parliament and also gave the finance ministry the
possibility of setting binding budgetary ceilings, not only helped to achieve
the ‘miracle’ of the Italian budget in 1997 but also quite explicitly aimed at
allowing cyclical stabilization after the start of EMU (Felsen, 1999; OECD,
2000a: 74). Overall, the budgetary procedure was clearly rendered more effec-
tive (see de Haan et al., 1999).
In 1999, a national stability pact was implemented to revise the seven-
year-old law on the decentralization of fiscal spending. This measure is of
particular interest because it clearly went against the recommendations of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which
encouraged Italy to decentralize rather than to re-centralize fiscal spending
authority (OECD, 2000a).
Reforms in the Italian wage-setting system took place before the de facto
date of entry into EMU. After the abolition of indexed wage-setting (‘scala
mobile’) in 1992, a social pact was signed under pressure from the govern-
ment in 1993.9 This pact was then subsequently renewed and established a
system of decentralized coordination (Regini, 2000) that clearly established
stronger internal leadership within collective bargaining while also increas-
ing government involvement in wage-setting (Regalia and Regini, 1999).
Although the Italian reforms in wage-setting thus fit the expectations of this
paper, there are good reasons to believe that they were implemented with the
aim of meeting the Maastricht criteria rather than primarily focusing on
cyclical stabilization after the start of EMU.
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Conclusion
This article has explained institutional reforms in fiscal policy and wage-
setting in 10 EMU member states since the mid 1990s. Arguing that EMU
member states had to anticipate a destabilizing impact on their domestic
economic cycles from the ‘one size fits all’ monetary policy of the ECB, it has
described institutional reforms as an anticipated adjustment process to
expected economic pressures arising from EMU. The overview of actual
adjustment processes in the 10 EMU member states studied here largely
confirms the approach of this article.
The findings of the article indicate that a central impact of EMU on
domestic economic policy institutions can be captured only within a short-
term or cyclical perspective on economic policy-making. Although this
conclusion should not come as a surprise to economists, it adds an import-
ant dimension to recent research in political science. Indeed, the most influ-
ential studies in comparative political economy on the interplay between the
single monetary policy and domestic economic policy-making have so far put
their main emphasis on long-term factors. Assuming that monetary policy,
fiscal policy or wage-setting tend to adopt certain types of long-term orien-
tations (mainly ‘restrictive’ vs. ‘expansionary’ or ‘accommodative’ vs. ‘non-
accommodative’), differences in cross-country performances were derived
from theoretical models of how these long-term orientations could be linked
to underlying institutional features (see several contributions in Iversen et al.,
2000, as well as in Hall and Soskice, 2001).
The heuristics of this literature have been used to study the impact of
EMU on economic performance by treating EMU as a single economic unit
(Hall and Franzese, 1998; Iversen, 1998; Iversen, 1999a,b; Soskice and Iversen,
1998). As the results of this article suggest, however, this approach might not
be completely satisfactory. There are good reasons to believe that the imple-
mentation of EMU has resulted in a strengthening of domestic institutions in
fiscal policy-making and wage-setting. The appropriate level of analysis could
thus still be domestic, yet under the constraints of the single monetary policy.
Moreover, the hypotheses of such approaches might need to focus more
closely on the link between institutions and their roles as instruments in
cyclical stabilization, rather than studying exclusively long-term trends.
From the wider perspective of research on European integration, this
article’s suggestion that EMU actually brought a renaissance of domestic
economic policy institutions might shed new light on discussions related to
the coordination of economic policies in EMU. There might be a good case
for preserving a relatively high degree of national autonomy in fiscal policy
and wage-setting, rather than attempting to embed national economic policy
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choices within a framework of firm coordination at the European level (see
Enderlein, 2004b).
Finally, the article also points to the need for a wider definition of insti-
tution-focused comparative political economy. Studying monetary policy,
fiscal policy and wage-setting in parallel, instead of limiting research to only
one of these three areas, could be a fruitful exercise.
Notes
This article derives from a larger project on the adjustment of domestic economic
policy institutions to EMU (Enderlein, 2004a). I am grateful to Fritz W. Scharpf,
Alberta Sbragia, Mark Hallerberg, Bernhard Kittel, Martin Höpner, Michael Zürn
and the referees for comments and support.
1 De Haan et al. (1999) present a similar indicator. However, because they
include reforms implemented during the 1990s, they already capture the
effect of adjustment to EMU.
2 Owing to space constraints, it is not possible to make a detailed assessment
of the debate on centralized (Cameron, 1984; to some extent also Calmfors
and Driffill, 1988, with the ‘hump-shape’ hypothesis) vs. coordinated
(Soskice, 1990) systems. See Kenworthy (2001, 2003) for an overview of quan-
titative indicators of corporatism.
3 Social theory generally points to the difficulties decentralized institutions
have in accepting ‘deferred gratification’ (i.e. the acceptance of today’s losses
in view of future gains) in a system of collective action that might be subject
to free-riding behaviour (Elster, 1979).
4 Portugal, Ireland and Spain are not covered by the GWL data set. These cases
were analysed and scored individually, mainly on the basis of analyses in the
European Industrial Relations Review.
5 The cutting point between systems with ‘high government influence’ and
‘low government influence’ was set between 4 and 5: 4 refers to cases in which
governments provide wage-setters with macroeconomic data only, whereas
5 indicates that governments make concrete and clear wage recommen-
dations to wage-setters. In line with the literature, Italy was put into the group
with low government influence (Regalia and Regini, 1999; Regini, 2000).
Cases not covered by GWL (Ireland and Portugal) were taken from a com-
parable assessment in Traxler et al. (2001).
6 In contrast to Austria and the Netherlands, Belgium had preserved its truly
domestically oriented monetary policy during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Indeed, whereas the r2 for the correlation coefficients for short-term interest
rates between Germany and Austria/Netherlands is .96/.92 for the period
1982–95, it is as low as .29 in the Belgian case.
7 This paragraph builds on country reports on Ireland in the European Indus-
trial Relations Observatory. The reports are available online at URL:
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int.
8 The following exposition draws on Alho (2000) and the relevant country
reports of the European Industrial Relations Observatory.
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9 The European Industrial Relations Review described this offer under the title
‘Take It or Leave It’ (No. 236, 1993: 23).
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